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This article builds on the ethics of Watsuji Tetsurô (1889–
1960) through a comparison with Mori Akira’s (1915–1976) 
the philosophy of education to show how Watsuji’s “ethics 
of emptiness” can be concretely manifested in human 
formation. While keeping Watsuji’s ethics in view, this 
article examines Mori Akira’s early philosophy of moral 
education in the 1950s, which can be found in his 
philosophy book, his teacher’s manual, and his moral 
education student textbooks. This article begins with 
Watsuji’s idea of “human existence” and its similarities with 
Mori Akira’s idea of “human becoming,” which adds a 
 
1 This paper was written with the aid of funding from Japan Society for the 









developmental angle to Watsuji’s tensional view of the 
human being. It then proceeds to sketch out how ethics and 
education emerge from the view of human being/becoming 
of both thinkers. Finally, it carefully analyzes the key 
problem of the “dual-negative structure”: How can we be 
good if goodness requires that we be both individual and 
collective, two aspects that are negatively related to each 
other? After showing Watsuji’s issues, it shows Mori’s 
contribution, which includes philosophical theory, scientific 
theories drawn from developmental psychology, and praxis 
drawn from Mori Akira’s textbooks. 
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atsuji Tetsurô (1889–1960) is the single greatest figure 
in modern Japanese ethics. In a time when western 
influence was flooding Japan, he acquired a deep mastery of 
western ethics (particularly Aristotle, Hegel, and Kant) but 
combined them with eastern philosophy (Theravāda and 
Mahāyāna Buddhism, Confucianism, and a touch of Shinto, 
as well as the influences of the Kyoto School of Philosophy). 
The result of which was his masterpiece in systematic 
ethics—three volumes simply entitled Ethics published in 
1937, 1942, and 1949. 
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The value of this work is being acknowledged across the 
globe, with research written about Watsuji and the ethics of 
care, environment, sociality, et cetera. There have also been 
several attempts to connect Watsuji to education,2 but one 
difficulty arises from the abstractness of his ideas. Despite the 
intuitive appeal of his idea of ethics as the “tensional 
realization” of both individuality and community in human 
existence, it does not give any clear guidance. It leads one to 
ask: Are we called to support individualization or a turn to 
community? What kind of individualization/solidarity are 
needed? None of the answers to these are spelled out. 
To bring Watsuji’s ideas closer to the ground, I shift my 
focus to a philosopher of education, Mori Akira (森昭 1915–
1976). Mori Akira 3 , once head of the Japan Educational 
Research Association, is well-known in Japan as one of the 
leaders in the field of educational science.4 He was one of the 
key players in rebuilding education (particularly moral 
education) in the chaotic post-war period, into the period of  
high economic growth. Unlike many members of the Kyoto 
 
2 For example, see Anton Luis Sevilla, “Cultural-Moral Difference in Global 
Education: Rethinking Theory and Praxis via Watsuji Tetsurô,” Educational 
Studies in Japan: International Yearbook 12 (2018): 23–34. 
3 I will refer to his name in full, because Mori is a very common surname in 
Japan. All Japanese names are given in their Japanese order (Surname First 
Name). 
4 My reading of Mori Akira is particularly indebted to the extensive Mori 
scholarship of Tanaka Tsunemi. For biographical details, see Tanaka Tsunemi, 
“Mori Akira no kyôiku ningengaku: Tôgôgaku to genriron o junkan suru seisei 
riron” [Mori Akira’s Philosophical Anthropology of Education], in Ningengaku. 
Nihon no kyôiku ningengaku, ed. Sumeragi Norio and Yano Satoji (Tamagawa, 
1999). 




School who were associated with statism, he was a strong 
supporter of democracy and human rights, publishing 
extensively on John Dewey. But he also held some Marxist 
ideas, and was very fond of existentialism (which are not 
unlike the Kyoto School)—translating the books of Karl 
Jaspers and Otto Bollnow (Heidegger’s student). He also 
wrote Philosophical Anthropology of Education (Kyôiku ningengaku, 
1961), a massive tome (850 pages long) of all the related 
sciences of the human person—psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, history—as applied to education.5 
Despite the strongly “western scientific” impression his 
work gives, Mori Akira was a member of the Kyoto School of 
Philosophy through-and-through. He studied philosophy 
under Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) at Kyoto University. 
Tanabe was a large influence on his philosophy, and he 
continuously corresponded with Tanabe (receiving feedback 
on his writings) until Tanabe passed away.6 He also worked in 
close proximity to and often cited Kimura Motomori (1895–
1946), a student of Nishida Kitarô (1870–1945) and another 
 
5  For a full introduction in English, see the articles of Yano Satoji and 
Tanaka Tsunemi in Saito Naoko and Paul Standish, Education and the Kyoto School 
of Philosophy: Pedagogy for Human Transformation (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 
chapters 3 and 5. 
A list of all of Mori Akira’s writings and a summary of their contents can be 
found in Tanaka Tsunemi, “Mori Akira o yomu: Kyôikuteki kôkyôsei kara 
sedai keishôteki kôkyôsei e” [Reading Mori Akira], in Nihon kyôikugaku no keifu, 
by Ogasawara Michio, Tanaka Tsunemi, Morita Hisao, Yano Satoji (Keisô 
Shobô, 2014). 
6  See Tanaka, “Reading Mori Akira” for details on the correspondence 
between Tanabe and Mori Akira. 




member of the Kyoto School who worked in the field of 
education. In his writings, he often cites Kôyama Iwao, Miki 
Kiyoshi, and Kuki Shûzô (all younger members of the 
Kyoto School). Most importantly, he often cites Watsuji 
(almost more than any other Japanese thinker), and I argue 
that he has adopted Watsuji’s most important questions. 
In this article, I will build on Watsuji’s ethics—
particularly, the ideas of human existence, becoming good, 
and the dual-negative structure—by closely examining Mori 
Akira’s philosophy of moral education. I will focus on the 
early to middle period of Mori Akira’s work, particularly: The 
Practicality and Inwardness of Education (Kyôiku no jissensei to 
naimensei published in 1955), which was a philosophical 
manuscript; The Moral Education We Want (Minna no negau 
dôtoku kyôiku published in 1958), which was a teacher’s 
manual; and New Life (Atarashii seikatsu published in 1958), a 
series of companion textbooks published for elementary and 
middle school students. 7  Due to the different natures of 
these books, it gives us a unique opportunity to see how his 
philosophy, teaching, and learning come together to realize a 
“tensional ethics” like Watsuji’s. Through these, I will 
demonstrate how Mori contributes a coherent view of how  
human existence becomes, how ethics ties to education, and 
how this ethical existence develops. And in so doing, I hope 
 
7 New Life was authored under the leadership of Katsube Mitake, a student of 
Watsuji, which shows another connection between the two thinkers. While there 
is no extant information on this, Mori and Katsube had very different political 
views, and this might have been a rather difficult working relationship. 




to show how Mori Akira takes up Watsuji’s key questions and 
carries them forward to novel conclusions. 
1. From Human Existence to Human Becoming 
One of the aspects of philosophy that Watsuji and the 
Kyoto School are best known for is the philosophy of human 
existence. Watsuji, Miki, Kuki, and Kôyama all wrote in a 
genre of “philosophical anthropology,” more succinctly 
known in Japanese as ningengaku—literally “the study of the 
human,” which translates to the German word Anthropologie 
and refers to anthropology prior to its separation from 
philosophy as an independent social science. Watsuji wrote a 
widely-read book called Ethics as the Study of Human Existence 
(Ningen no gaku toshite no rinrigaku published in 1934), where he 
suggests a view of human existence (ningen sonzai) as 
individual (nin, person) and communal (gen, between), an 
etymology that suggests that we are always-already relational 
but at the same time irreducibly individual. He characterizes 
human existence as temporal (son) and spatial (zai), always 
bound in its relations with others in both time and space. As 
subjective (shu) and objective (kyaku), human beings live a life 
of subjective meaning that is inseparable from objective acts 
and connections. All these facets come together to make our 
complex, tensional existence. And for Watsuji, our ability to 
realize this tensional existence—to be both individual and 




social, without betraying either—is essential to our ability to 
be good human beings—ethics.8 
Mori Akira has a similar holistic view of human existence, 
which he approaches via the phenomena of education. But 
first, such a view of education cannot be narrowly reduced to 
schooling on reading, writing, and arithmetic. Mori Akira 
examines the history of philosophy of education and finds 
that there are four fundamental “types” of education: 
education as transmission, where adults convey culturally 
valuable information; education as growth, where children 
mature physically and mentally and acquire abilities; education 
as formation, where children are taught to act according to 
the “form” of culture; and finally, education as awakening, 
where people come to terms with their own existence 
primarily through their own power.9 (This historical approach 
arrives at what contemporary philosopher of education Gert 
Biesta arrives at conceptually—the qualifying, socializing, and 
subjectivizing functions of education—which can be used as 
 
8 Watsuji Tetsurô, Watsuji Tetsurô zenshû [The Collected Works of Watsuji 
Tetsurô] Vol. 9 (Iwanami Shoten, 1962), 16. 
For the details of this view of human existence and a summary of Watsuji’s 
ethics in full, see Anton Luis Sevilla, “The Ethical System of Watsuji 
Tetsurô,”Watsuji Tetsurô’s Global Ethics of Emptiness: A Contemporary Look at a 
Modern Japanese Philosopher (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 1–38. 
9 Mori Akira, “Kyôiku no jissensei to naimensei: dôtoku kyôiku no hansei” 
[The Practicality and Inwardness of Education: Reflections on Moral Education], 
in Shinpen Mori Akira chosakushû Vol. 4, ed. Tanaka Tsunemi (Gakujutsu 
Shuppankai, 2015), 19–23. 




a framework to talk about ethical issues in education despite 
differing views on education.10) 
This multi-faceted view of education implies a much 
broader definition of the word “education” (kyôiku). 
Education is not simply about going to school, or learning 
cognitive or social skills, or even maturation in general. 
Instead, he sees education simply as human becoming: 
Let us define education as human becoming, in 
relation to others. . . . The task of educational 
philosophical anthropology (kyôiku ningengaku) is 
to clarify the process of human becoming in 
relation to others according to the structure of 
human existence.11 
Education is the process of human becoming (ningen seisei) 
that occurs via various occasions of transmission, growth, 
formation, awakening, and how these four come together. 
“Human becoming” is the core concept in Mori Akira’s 
philosophy. He writes, “‘Ningen becoming ningen,’ this is what 
education is. To summarize, education is ningen seisei 
(Menschwerden, becoming of man).”12 Let us explore it further 
through each word. 
 
10 Gert Biesta, Good Education in an Age of Measurement: Ethics, Politics, Democracy 
(London: Paradigm Publishers, 2010), 19. 
11 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 246. I translated all citations 
from the Japanese. 
12 Ibid., 16. 




First, “human” (ningen) is a peculiar word. Briefly returning 
to Watsuji, the ethicist famously suggests that “ningen” can 
refer to the individual, multiple human beings, humankind in 
general, etc. Its Chinese characters contain both the word for 
“man” and “between.”13 Similarly, Mori Akira sees “ningen” as 
a fundamentally tensional existence. As the book title 
suggests, his early philosophy focused on the tension between 
“inwardness”—something individual (nin), seen in the focus 
of idealism—and “practicality”—something communal (gen), 
seen in the focus of pragmatism and Marxism. In Mori 
Akira’s Philosophical Anthropology of Education, these are 
separated into three “contradictions” that form the tensional 
character of human existence: individual vs. social, natural vs. 
historical, spiritual vs. corporeal—a list that is identical to 
what Watsuji presents above. 
Second, “becoming” (seisei, to be born + to become) 
emphasizes how human existence is a dynamic process—we 
change and develop, rather than just being born “as we are.” 
Mori Akira clarifies his stance vis-à-vis Nicolai Hartmann: 
A glaring lack of Hartmann’s ontology is that he 
was so focused on establishing the spatial hierarchy 
of matter, life, psyche, and spirit that he closed off 
the generative (“becoming-like,” seiseiteki) relation, 
or to borrow a concept of contemporary biology, 
 
13 In the English translation, we see this in Watsuji Tetsurô, Watsuji Tetsurô’s 
Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan, trans. Yamamoto Seisaku and Robert E. Carter (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 12–15. 




the genetic hierarchy (hasseiteki dankaisei) of matter, 
life, psyche, and spirit.14 
Many views of what makes human existence unique focus 
on the various aspects of the human being, without 
sufficiently stressing that these aspects (reason, freedom, 
spirit) are not merely given but that they develop and unveil 
in time—human beings need to become human. To cite the 
Kantian phrase, “The human being can only become human 
through education.” 15  However, in Mori Akira’s idea of 
becoming, we find an important nuance in the tension 
between “change” and “development.” “Development” 
suggests a developmentalism with a clear telos and principles, 
whereas “change” suggests mere variation without necessarily 
having a direction.16 Mori Akira continues, 
The philosophy of becoming correctly considers 
the heteronomous individuality of the various 
layers of existence, but simultaneously must 
investigate the generative relationship between 
these layers. Needless to say, this is a difficult task. 
On one hand, one grasps the layers of existence in 
a discontinuous relationship, and simultaneously 
 
14 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 248. 
15  Immanuel Kant, “Lectures on Pedagogy,” in Anthropology, History, and 
Education: The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 9:443. 
16 This is a problem Mori Akira will wrestle with again and in detail in his 
final book, The Fundamental Principles of Human Formation, but I leave this for 
another article. 




one tries to investigate the relation of generative 
continuity between them. Can this task succeed? 
Is this task not in danger of falling into great 
contradiction? . . . However, seeing this task as a 
contradiction means that one has not correctly 
grasped the essence of becoming. Becoming is 
not merely continuity, but discontinuous 
continuity (hirenzokuteki renzoku).17 
In this view of becoming, people “develop,” but 
development includes moments of discontinuity and crisis, 
making it impossible for development to be explained by 
virtue of one principle. For example, natural life (as an 
organism) “develops” into historical life (conscious life) and 
into personal life (as self-awareness). But historical life cannot 
be explained purely through natural principles, nor personal 
life purely through historical principles, resulting in a 
continuity of discontinuity.18 Mori Akira carries out a double-
 
17 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 248–249. 
Continuity of discontinuity is an important concept in Nishida Kitarô, but 
possibly also Tanabe Hajime, and Mori Akira may be deliberately responding to 
their ideas. See Higaki Tatsuya, “The Concept of ‘Continuity of Discontinuity’ in 
the Later Works of Nishida,” YouTube video, 47:02, from the Fourth Annual 
Conference of the European Network of Japanese Philosophy on September 
2018, posted by “European Network of Japanese Philosophy,” June 25, 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gX6bBbNeDq4. 
18 The principle behind this becoming remains unclear in the 1950s, but in 
his Philosophical Anthropology of Education, he expounds on this via the idea of 
“superstasis”—an idea he was beginning to play around with in The Moral 
Education We Want. If human beings were homeostasis-seeking beings, 
disruptions (of our bodies for example) would merely lead to a return to 
equilibrium, meaning that everything would be reducible to development, and 
 




critique here, both of those who ignored the continuity of 
man with animals and the cosmos as a whole, and those who 
did not see the discontinuity (as in evolutionism). 
Furthermore, “human becoming” can mean the fact of 
“humans becoming” (ningen ga seisei suru) or the value-laden 
“becoming human” (ningen ni seisei suru). The former, “human 
becoming,” is implying an empirical question of “How do 
humans change?” The latter, “becoming human,” is implying 
a normative question of “What development leads to 
becoming human?” 
The phrase “human becoming” includes individuality and 
sociality, continuity and discontinuity, empirical facts and 
norms. This means that any study of human becoming must 
necessarily be interdisciplinary. Understanding both the 
empirical and ideal aspects of the unfolding of humans (as 
individual/social, natural/historical, corporeal/spiritual) 
requires a whole range of disciplines: philosophy of the 
individual, philosophy of society, personality psychology, 
developmental psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
history—the list goes on. It would take Mori Akira until 1961 
to develop a coherent view of this interdisciplinary human 
 
there would be no real qualitative shifts. But because we seek a higher level of 
equilibrium, then disruptions (ex. limitations in conscious control of things) can 
result in higher forms of complexity (ex. self-awareness). He takes the idea from 
personality psychologists Henry Murray and Clyde Kluckhohn. 
Mori Akira, Kyôiku ningengaku: Ningen seisei toshite no kyôiku [Philosophical 
Anthropology of Education: Education as Human Becoming] in Shinpen Mori 
Akira Chosakushû vols. 5–6, ed. Tanaka Tsunemi (Gakujutsu Shuppankai, 2015), 
317. 




science. However, in 1955, he already had this in mind. This 
is evident in the process of development we will explore 
next.19 
Except for the stress on the process of becoming, all these 
aspects of human becoming are shared by Watsuji’s view of 
human existence. For example, in Ethics, Watsuji examines 
everyday life in order to determine how societies and 
relationships are and simultaneously tries to draw out how 
societies “ought to be” (facts and norms). Interdisciplinarity is 
expressed in how Watsuji examines everyday life, drawing on 
the work of well-known thinkers, sociologist Emile 
Durkheim and anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, and on 
different subjects, such as geography, philosophy of history, 
et cetera. This interdisciplinary approach allows us to 
understand the facts of human existence. Strangely, Mori 
Akira makes no mention of these similarities, despite 
repeatedly citing Watsuji. But might there not be some 
influence of Watsuji on Mori Akira here? 
It is not merely the content of the idea of human 
existence/becoming, but the overall structure of the 
argument that they share. If one summarizes the view above, 
one finds that both thinkers are arguing for ethics/education 
to be based on the realization of the tensional structure of 
human existence. In a very telling line, Mori writes: 
 
19  Mori Akira’s view of interdisciplinarity would give birth to Osaka 
University’s Human Sciences Department, one of the first interdisciplinary 
programs in Japan. 




Actually, the very human existence tasked with 
becoming essentially bears various tensions, 
oppositions, and contradictions. Even that 
“ethics” is only spoken of by ningen which comes 
from the essence of ningen sonzai tasked with 
becoming. . . . The study of educational practice is 
the system of practical knowledge about 
education. And ethics is none other than the 
system of practical knowledge about life.20 
Taking education broadly as all things that influence human 
becoming, education and ethics become inseparable as the 
unfolding of this tensional human existence. 
2. Ethics, Education, and Virtues 
From these similar views of human existence/becoming, 
both Watsuji and Mori Akira develop systematic views on the 
unfolding of the good life. Watsuji sees truthfulness (shinjitsu 
or makoto, a conscientious response to trust) as the 
foundation of ethics. Truthfulness and trust both have to do 
with an openness and response to our communal nature as 
human beings but also our ability to critically approach things 
as individuals. This makes truthfulness relational but not 
merely conformist.21 
 
20 Mori, Philosophical Anthropology of Becoming, 820–821. 
21 See Watsuji, “Chapter 13: Trust and Truth,” in Watsuji Tetsurô’s Rinrigaku: 
Ethics in Japan, 265–282.  




Relational truthfulness manifests in different forms 
(“virtues”) depending on the context. In Ethics II, Watsuji lists 
different virtues for couples (fidelity, chastity, martial 
harmony), family life (a two-way view of filial piety), local 
community (becoming a full-fledged member, fraternité, 
consideration), economic life (mutual service), cultural life 
(friendship), the state (justice, obedience, benevolent rule), 
and international relations (national self-realization and 
political/economic/cultural unity).22 
Just as Watsuji develops ethics from human existence, 
Mori Akira develops a fundamentally moral view of education 
through his view of human becoming. After briefly citing 
Watsuji to argue that ethical systems, as historical, must 
remain open systems, 23  Mori Akira gives the following 
framework: First, while resisting the discourse of moral 
essences, he sees the foundation of ethics (its subjective 
starting point, as it were) to be “sincerity” (seijitsu, which is 
nearly linguistically identical to the shinjitsu and makoto used in 
Watsuji’s “truthfulness”). Mori understands sincerity as being 
open to, inquiring, and having a sense of seriousness toward 
our moral situation. It is expressed in how we comport 
ourselves toward ourselves, others, and reality, how we take 
 
22 See Watsuji, “Chapter 1: The Significance of Ethics as the Study of Ningen,” 
Watsuji Tetsurô’s Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan, 9–27. Watsuji’s system is explained in 
full in Sevilla. 
Also, a detailed examination of virtues in Watsuji can be found in Kyle 
Michael James Shuttleworth, “Virtues and Ethics within Watsuji Tetsurô’s 
Rinrigaku,” Philosophy East and West (forthcoming). 
23 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 169. 




up human contradictions (like being a “moral animal”) with a 
sense of resoluteness, and how we seek out some ground for 
right and wrong amidst the shifting terrain of morality. 24 It is 
similar to Watsuji’s truthfulness in its sense of openness to 
contradiction and its seeking to realize the absolute—
expressed not in emptiness but in more existential terms. 
Like the dual-structure realized in trust and truthfulness, 
Mori Akira’s idea of sincerity has two presuppositions: 
autonomy and solidarity. This idea is expressed in four 
domains: ethics of self (private self-formation), ethics of 
creativity (work and generativity), ethics of communion (for 
informal groups), and ethics of the group (for formal groups 
like the state).25 
Sincerity 
Autonomy Solidarity 
Ethics of Self Creativity Communion The Group 
Introspection Diligence Manners Public Morals 
Self-Actualization Inquiry Trust Engagement 
Humor  Kindness Patriotism 
Moderation  Tolerance  
Table 1. The Four Domains of Mori Akira’s Idea of Sincerity. 
 
 
24 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 86, 106, 166–167, 177. 
25 Ibid., 174. 




Thus, virtues are spread out on a continuum from private 
to public. The content of these virtues is unpacked by 
another list that Mori Akira included in his moral education 
guide for teachers. Concerned that the former list would feed 
into a “bag of virtues approach,” he created a list of maxims 
that might serve as a more concrete guide.26 
Sincerity 
Autonomy Solidarity 
Ethics of Self Creativity Communion The Group 
Value yourself. Have joy in 
your work and 
persevere. 
Become someone 
who does not cause 










Think of the feelings 




Say what you 
mean. 
Do not live 
wastefully. 
Listen to the opinion 
of others. 
Be responsible 
and fulfill your 
duties. 
Act in a way that 
fits the situation. 
Do work that 
is good for all. 
Have good manners 
and right conduct. 
Cooperate with 
everyone in the 
spirit of 
friendship. 
Seek the truth to 
the end. 
 Be kind and do not 
begrudge the success 
of others. 
 
Become a wise 
person who is 
rich in spirit. 
 Become someone 
people can trust. 
 
Table 2. Mori Akira’s Maxims for the Idea of Sincerity. 
 
26 Mori Akira, Minna no negau dôtoku kyôiku [The Moral Education We Want] 
(Reimei Shobô, 1958), 157. 




These lists give a gist of the kind of person Mori Akira 
was hoping education could form. He adds on various 
intermediate and ultimate aims to the list above—which I 
abbreviate here—but he summarized his moral system as 
such: “If one were to talk of morality as a human body, the 
nervous system would be sincerity, autonomy and solidarity 
would be the skeleton, freedom and justice would be its two 
legs, and fraternité would be its heart.”27 
What we see here is a close structural similarity between 
Watsuji and Mori Akira: Human existence/becoming unfolds 
via ethics/education that is founded on truthfulness/sincerity 
and manifests as different virtues and values in different 
levels of private and public life. 
3. The Dual-Negative Structure 
Despite the structural similarity of these two thinkers, 
their core, the engine or bones of their ethics, so to speak—
the tensional relationship between individuality/totality (or 
autonomy/solidarity)—shows both their differences and 
Mori Akira’s potential contribution. 
Let us begin with Watsuji’s view of this “engine.” Human 
beings have a contradiction worked into their very essence. 
Individuality is only possible by negating the community to 
have a sense of authentic self, and totality (communality) is 
only possible by negating individual separateness. If this is 
so, how is it possible for the individual to be good? 
 
27 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 175. 




Now that ningen’s sonzai is, fundamentally 
speaking, a movement of negation makes it clear 
that the basis of ningen’s sonzai is negation as such, 
that is, absolute negation. The true reality of an 
individual, as well as of totality, is “emptiness,” 
and this emptiness is the absolute totality. Out of 
this ground, from the fact that this emptiness is 
emptied, emerges ningen’s sonzai as a movement of 
negation.28 
Ethics is possible by realizing “emptiness” through the 
movement of negation, which has two moments: 
One of these is the establishment of the 
individual as the other, over against totality. What 
is at stake here is the taking of a first step toward 
self-awareness. Apart from the self-awareness of 
an individual, there is no social ethics. The other  
moment is the individual’s surrender to the 
totality. This is what has been called the demand of 
the super individual will, or of total will. Without this 
surrender, there is also no social ethics.29 
We need both the negation of individuality and totality 
to establish either, making both alternately necessary. 
However, as I suggest in a separate article30, Watsuji falls 
 
28 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsurô’s Rinrigaku, 23. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Sevilla, Watsuji Tetsurô, 82 




into a contradiction by posing two irreconcilable ethical 
models. The first is “the model of continuous negation,” 
where individuality and totality endlessly alternate in order 
to realize emptiness (and avoid the excesses of either). 
The self-return of the Absolute is realized 
endlessly, and has nothing to do with a static and 
absolute destination. The place in which this self-
returning is exhibited is the socio-ethical whole 
as finite. This is why the movement of the 
negation of absolute negativity is said to be the 
law of human beings; that is, it is ethics.31 
And the second is “the three-stage model of negation,” 
where we begin with collective existence, realize 
individuality, but then end with totality as the final telos: 
An individual becomes an individual by negating 
emptiness (i.e., authentic emptiness) as her own 
fundamental source. This is the self-negation of 
absolute negativity. In addition to that, an 
individual must be subordinate to society 
through emptying herself, regardless of how this 
emptying is performed. This means that 
emptiness is materialized in various associations 
to varying degrees. Therefore, an individual 
 
31 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsurô’s Rinrigaku, 121. 




returns to “emptiness” itself, through engaging 
in the association of whatever sort.32 
Perhaps one cause of this contradictory argument is that 
Watsuji was wrestling with the problem of individuality and 
communality as experienced in ethical life without the 
benefit of an established discipline of developmental 
psychology—a limitation Mori Akira tried to overcome. 
3.1 A Three-Layered Triangle 
This is where Mori Akira makes an interesting 
contribution to Watsuji’s theory. First, Mori represents the 
tensional view of the human being we previously presented 





Figure 1. The tensional view of the human being. 
(Left: English translation by author. Right: Original) 
 
In figure one, we see that human existence includes natural 
life (bottom of the triangle), social life (left side), cultural life 
(right side), and personal life (top). However, seen throughout 
 
32 Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsurô’s Rinrigaku, 117. 




the process of schooling, we see that this balance is not static, 
but it shifts and forms (fig.2). 
 
Figure 2. Dynamic development of human existence.   
(Left: English translation by author. Right: Original) 
 




In infancy (the top triangle), the bottom arrow shows that 
natural life and growth predominate, and the influence of 
society and culture are weaker and one-way. But in 
childhood (second triangle), social formation (left) and 
cultural transmission (right) become more dominant, and 
the direction of influence becomes more clearly two-way. 
Finally, in youth (third triangle), personal life (the top arrow) 
and its awakening begin to manifest. The details of this 
development show a concrete approach to one of the 
biggest questions left behind by Watsuji’s ethics. Let us go 
through each stage, focusing particularly on the relationship 
between the individual and the whole. 
Mori Akira develops the triangles above into a three-layer 
view of personality that he derives from Erich Rothacker, a 
proponent of philosophical anthropology. Mori writes, 
Rothacker “broadly divides personality into the layer of the 
subconscious depths of personality, the conscious depths of 
personality, and the conscious personality, which I think can 
be renamed as (1) the organic layer (seitai sô, or life layer 
seimei sô) of personality, (2) the conscious layer (ishiki sô), and 
(3) the self-aware layer (jikaku sô).”33 This is seen in figure 3, 






33 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 125. 






Figure 3. Three-layer view of personality.34 
(Top: English translation by author. Bottom: Original.) 
The first layer, which roughly coincides with Jaspers’s 
experiential world image (erlebtes Weltbild),35 has to do with 
our direct experience of our environment (our “psycho-
physical life”). “‘Living’ means that the organism maintains 
dynamic equilibrium both externally and internally. The 
organism derives its energy to act from the environment, 
 
34 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 125. 
35 Ibid., 130–134. Mori directly draws from Jaspers’s Psychologie der 
Weltanschauung in Practicality and Inwardness.  




and tries to proceed with life activities that bear individual 
unity.”36 He uses Jakob von Uexküll’s model to schematize 
this: we sense the world (receptor) and act in the world 
(effector), forming a functional cycle (Funktionskreis), 
through which we inhabit our experiential lifeworld. 37 
Education as “growth”—learning from one’s struggle with 
the environment, problem-solving, an “experimental” 
attitude to everyday life (Mori Akira highlights Jean Jacques 
Rousseau and John Dewey for these views)—all center 
around the dynamic quality of this psycho-physical life.  
However, this almost animal existence is but a fraction of 
human existence. Gradually, a second layer develops: 
As the individual develops in a human manner, the 
satisfaction of desires becomes more indirect . . . . 
Between the loss and restoration of equilibrium, 
intelligence and customs are interposed . . . With 
the indirectness of the satisfaction of desires, the 
individual starts to have more of an inside 
(naimen).38 
This “inside” is the conscious layer or Jaspers’s objectivized 
world image (objektiviertes Weltbild), which begins to play a 
central role in our lives (usually in school age or slightly 
earlier). Mori Akira draws on Ernst Cassirer, showing that 
 
36 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 256. 
37 Ibid., 114. 
38 Ibid., 260. 




our relation to the world is not merely direct, but is mediated 
by symbols. The way a child perceives objects begins to be 
influenced by their names: “chair,” “table,” “honesty,” 
“lying.” We experience things and act on them, all the while 
naming them, making sense of them, and building them into 
a symbolic system. Education as social formation (also known 
as Durkheim’s methodic socialization, Bildung) and as 
transmission of culturally valuable information both focus on 
this symbolic layer of human life. After all, the objectivized 
world image is not made from scratch, but from the symbols 
and ways of acting that we share with society. 
What we have here is a “discontinuity,” a shift from 
directly relating with the environment to a richly “inward” 
(but also social) life of symbols and consciousness. But this 
discontinuity must be bridged with a sense of continuity. 
I want to tell Cassirer, “while dealing with things 
themselves, human beings simultaneously 
dialogue with themselves.” Also, I need to tell 
Dewey, “while dialoguing with ourselves, human 
beings interact with the environment.”39 
There is an implicit challenge here of how to live this inward 
life in a way that serves outward concerns and vice-versa. 
Finally, we have the development of a third layer. 
Through both the dialogue with the environment and the 
dialogue with oneself, foundations are lain for “self-
 
39 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 118. 




awareness” (jikaku). “Jikaku” is a loaded word in the Kyoto 
School of Philosophy and is usually used to mean some 
form of religious self-awakening (as in Nishida and Mori 
Akira’s own teacher Tanabe). But Mori Akira divides it into 
two—“S1” and “S2”—which he explains as follows: 
Self-awareness does not come out all of a sudden 
entirely from the “inward” part of an individual. . 
. . In order for full-fledged self-awareness (S2) to 
awaken, 1. Before that, Dewey’s “meaningful 
action” needs to sufficiently develop. Elementary 
school education focuses on this development. 
Next, 2. Children need to be guided to “perceive 
the meaning of (their own) acts.” . . . What effects 
does one’s attitude and behavior have on other 
people and groups? What responses does it result 
in? They need to be taught to sufficiently think 
about this. This sort of self-awareness (the 
perception of the meaning of one’s acts) develops 
from the higher grades of elementary school to 
middle school. Anyhow, it is by this development 
and this guidance that self-awareness (S1) of an 
individual’s social action awakens.40 
Self-awareness S1 is the awareness of the meaning of one’s 
acts that results in the turning of one’s conscious gaze from 
the outside inward. One names not only things like chairs, 
 
40 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 141–142. 




but develops a concept of oneself, an identity: “student,” 
“classmate,” “friend,” “girlfriend/boyfriend,” et cetera. 
One’s sense of responsibility based on one’s role is rooted in 
this form of self-awareness. 
However, with the development of S1 comes the 
realization as well that one’s meaning is not reducible to one’s 
social identity. One realizes one’s physical differences from 
others, one’s conscious differences from others. One realizes 
that one is not only conscious of oneself but is also conscious 
of this consciousness itself—a subjective center of reflection 
that can dynamically relate to itself. As Mori Akira explains: 
Thinking and attitude, which to this point have 
been facing outward, is “reflected” inward, and 
“reflection” occurs. When one clearly realizes 
“self,” for the first time full-fledged self-
awareness (S2) awakens.41 
This “self-awareness (S2) within self-awareness 
(S1)” is the true self-awareness. Dewey’s self-
awareness is no more than the first self-
awareness. . . . Self-awareness (S2) is an activity of 
the subject that becomes self-aware of this self-
awareness. It is a double self-awareness. If 
Dewey’s self-awareness (S1) is flat and two-
dimensional, true self-awareness (S2) is volumetric 
and three-dimensional. It is this three-dimensional 
 
41Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 145.  




self-aware subject that truly has “individuality” 
and is an existential person.42  
Mori Akira also links this self-awareness (S2) with the 
critique of inauthentic everydayness (in Heidegger’s terms), 
the realization of universal values like truth, goodness, 
beauty, and holiness, as well as Jaspers’s existential 
realization of limit situations and the absolute.43 This forms 
a layer of self-awareness Mori Akira sometimes refers to as 
“plus x.” (Strictly speaking, S2 is the kind of awareness, 
whereas “plus x” is the domain in which it occurs.) 
The kind of education that deals directly with the self-
aware layer of human existence is “education as 
awakening”—an education he attributes to Socrates’s 
midwifery, Kant’s ethics, existentialism (and religion). He 
describes this poignantly:  
Is this “growth”? No, it is not a growth that has 
continuity, but deals with the discontinuous leaps 
and turns of man. Is it “formation”? No, rather 
than a forming that gives shape, is it not the 
explosive combustion of the soul? Then, is it 
“transmission?” No, it is not the reception of 
something but the spirit’s inward “fulfillment” 
(jûjitsu).44 
 
42 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 145–146. 
43 Ibid., 261–275. 
44 Ibid., 25–26. 




At first glance, it may seem that Mori Akira has taken a 
similar tactic to Watsuji’s “three-stage model,” but turned it 
on its head. It seems as if ethics moves from an individual 
organism, to a much more socialized conscious being, and 
finally, back to a self-aware individual. Watsuji saw it as a 
movement from totality to individuality and then back to 
totality. Mori’s view would also be similar to Lawrence 
Kohlberg (who was after Mori’s time), with morality 
developing from pre-conventional to conventional to post-
conventional stages. 
However, when we examine the details of Mori Akira’s 
view of development, we find that it is not so simple. He 
sees moral development as the development of both 
autonomy and solidarity. He details this dual development 
through his interpretation and additions to Erik Erikson and 
through his concrete suggestions for teaching. 
3.2 Mori Akira and Erikson 
Like Mori Akira’s view of the three layers of human 
existence, Erikson saw developmental psychology as 
needing a “triple bookkeeping” between “(1) The group. . . . 
(2) The patient’s organism . . . (3) The patient’s ego.”45 And 
as is well-known, Erikson developed one of the best models 
of the human lifecycle: “The Eight Ages of Man.” Through 
this triple-bookkeeping, Erikson sought to understand the 
 
45 Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (W. W. Norton and Company, 
1993), 37. 




development of identity. Drawing from this developmental 
psychology, Mori Akira sought to holistically consider how 
we develop morally as a process of self-understanding. 
Mori Akira had a “love affair” with this developmental 
theory. It forms the core of his theoretical discussion in The 
Practicality and Inwardness of Education and is his key to 
explaining how to understand children in The Moral Education 
We Want. He discusses it extensively in his Philosophical 
Anthropology of Education and continues to wrestle with it in 
his last book, The Fundamental Principles of Human Formation. 
Peculiarly, it turns up in his textbook for middle school 
students as well! 
In Mori Akira’s The Fundamental Principles of Human 
Formation, there is a chapter entitled “How the Self has 
Matured” (Jiko wa ika ni seichô shita ka) and written for third 
year middle school students. In this chapter we find the 
classic education story of Amala and Kamala, two alleged 
“wolf-children,” discovered by Joseph Amrito Lal Singh in 
India. After descriptions of the feral behavior of the two 
children, we are drawn into the slow nine-year long process 
of Kamala’s “becoming human” (with Amala dying early 
on). The students are then posed several questions: What do 
we need to become human? What does it mean to be 
human? Through vignettes, the writer (likely Mori Akira) 
then shares various struggles of ordinary children as they 
grow up: from the infant’s seeking love and trust, to the 
elementary child’s struggles for competence, and up to the 




adolescent struggle for identity (like the book’s potential 
readers).46 
What was so important about Erikson’s theory of 
development that he saw the need to teach it to scholars, 
teachers, and students alike? In this sub-section, I will 
discuss Mori Akira’s view of Erikson as is seen in his 
Practicality and Inwardness of Education, framing it with the 
“three layers” above and adding in practical examples he 
uses in his moral education textbooks (for both teachers and 
students) and theoretical insights from a chart he eventually 
developed in his Philosophical Anthropology of Education (fig. 4). 
 
Figure 4. Stages of human development through personal  
needs and social needs.47 
 
46 Atarashii Seikatsu Henshû Iinkai, 3rd year, 86–92. 




In this chart, which is very similar to Erikson’s table of 
the stages of human development, Mori lists the personal 
needs (upper left) that develop from infancy to childhood 
and to early adulthood. The developmental realizations are 
listed in the middle (Peace, Autonomy, Initiative, Ability, 
Individuality, Self-Realizing), showing continuity with the 
three layers of personality by Mori and Rothacker. The 
bottom half is quite unique to Mori Akira. He pairs personal 
needs with social needs (lower left) and social developmental 
realizations (Trust, Belonging, Togetherness, Role, 
Solidarity, Mission) that correspond with the individual 
developmental realizations. The following explanations will 
slowly unpack this chart, beginning from the 
individual/personal side of development and continuing 
with the social side in the following subsection on the 
development of solidarity. 
First, the organic layer appears to correspond with 
Erikson’s “basic trust vs. basic mistrust” and “autonomy vs. 
shame and doubt.”48 Mori Akira gives these stages his own 
names. For stage one he writes, “Children Want Warm 
Love.”49 In this stage (from zero to one year old), he talks 
about weakness and dependence in the human infant as 
compared to other primates. Our ability to come into 
 
47 Mori, Philosophical Anthropology of Education, 479. English overlay included 
by author.  
48 I use the names of the stages from Erikson, Childhood and Society, chapter 7. 
49 Mori, The Moral Education We Want, 37. 




“dialogue with the environment” comes from developing a 
sense of trust depending on how primary caregivers respond 
to our needs. He also takes a page out of Watsuji and talks 
about how trust is something connected to needing to be 
saved from dire situations. He further extends this 
conception of trust to all aspects of our lives. 
This continues to stage two: “Children Try to Do Things 
Themselves.”50 From one to four years old, children begin 
to build a sense of self by trying to do things on their own. 
An important “tug-of-war” happens between (a) the parent 
who tries to discipline the child or do things for the child 
and (b) the child who wants to do what he/she wants for 
him/herself. Like Erikson, he suggests the need to let this 
sense of autonomy develop but also keep the child from 
hurting him/herself or others. 
As the explanation for the “organic layer” suggests, the 
child in this stage has a primitive, tactile sense of trying to 
relate with the world as an embodied being. The child is in 
direct dialogue with the experiential lifeworld. However, 
while these may connect with Kohlberg’s “pre-conventional 
morality,” the impression that these stages are 
“individualistic” is mistaken. The very idea of “trust” (or 
“warm love”) is the foundation of sociality. And as we see in 
figure 4, “peace” and “autonomy” can only develop in 
tandem with social “trust” and “belonging.” Thus, Mori 
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Akira stresses a form of “home education” that provides the 
trust and belonging in which the child’s organic life can 
flourish. This home education usually takes place from three 
to seven years old and is characterized by how “Children 
Seek Opportunities to Grow”.51 
Second, in the conscious layer, we have “initiative vs. 
guilt” and “industry vs. inferiority.” In this stage, the 
influence of organic life is still very strong, but symbolic life 
grows, as evidenced by the endless asking of “Why? Why 
mama, why?” Children also begin to copy adults in what is 
referred to in Japanese as “gokko” (imitation games). These 
actions show children beginning their attempt to enter the 
symbolic order of adults and society. Here, parents need to 
both value the growing initiative and curiosity of the child 
but also discipline the child to let these desires develop in a 
constructive direction. 
The latter stage is expressed as “Children Hope to Be 
Full-Fledged Members (Ichininmae).”52 This corresponds to 
Kohlberg’s conventional morality par excellence. Mori Akira 
opens with a story of two children: one nervous about his 
entry to school and learning some of the basics from his 
older brother and another child who, so used to being told 
what to do (and lacking in autonomy and initiative), cannot 
even go to the toilet by himself. Here, the struggle of the 
child is to expand the self to include the objective world of 
 
51 Mori, The Moral Education We Want, 46. 
52 Ibid., 53. 




tools, ideas, and social order. However, Mori Akira also 
warns of the excesses of this stage: competence and 
incompetence that form status hierarchies, an excessive 
sense of competition, etc. 
In this symbolic stage, Mori Akira’s recommendation is 
that we return to Dewey’s focus on “meaningful action,” 
collective problem solving, and constantly learning to take a 
critical attitude about rules. But he also suggests the need to 
“stop and think.” In these forms of education, the focus is 
not only on “togetherness” and “roles” as the label 
“conventional morality” might suggest. But within such 
relationships, an agentic sense of initiative and ability form 
as well. This sense of individuality is now mediated by the 
various forms and symbols of social life. 
Third, in the self-aware layer, we have “identity vs. role 
confusion.” Until the 1960s, Mori Akira did not refer to 
Erikson’s later stages: “intimacy vs. isolation,” “generativity 
vs. stagnation,” and “ego integrity vs. despair.” But if we 
look at his following list of developmental goals in 
adolescence, we see that he includes these later stages in the 
challenges of adolescence: (1) “Individuality: Youth 
Repeatedly Assert Themselves,” (2) “Intimacy: Youth Seek 
Human Understanding,” (3) “Aspiration: Youth Pursue their 
Ideals,” and (4) “Independence: Independence is a New 
Departure.”53 
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However, if education for awakening corresponds to this 
self-aware layer, then it begs the question: How do you teach 
self-awareness, something that a person can only learn for 
himself? There are several chapters in the textbook for 
middle school students that may have been written by Mori 
Akira himself (as evidenced by similarities in the text and 
ideas he discusses in his own works): “The Feeling of 
Searching for Myself” (Middle School 2nd year), “How the 
Self has Matured” (3rd year), and “Valuing Myself” (3rd year). 
We have already briefly examined “How the Self has 
Matured.” This shows one form of education for self-
awareness. By talking about feral children and the process of 
human development, Mori seems to be trying to make 
students aware of their own process of maturation. (This has 
important ramifications for narrative education, but I must 
leave this for another occasion.) 
Allow me to further examine the chapter on “The Feeling 
of Searching for Myself.” Here we find a story about the 
homeroom class of a boy called Genji. The teacher raises an 
example from another student, Kiyoshi’s diary. Kiyoshi 
overheard his parents talking about him. When he asked 
them about it, they responded, “This isn’t something 
children should be listening to (or asking about).” On 
another day, after forgetting to clean up as he promised, his 
mother scolded him, “Kiyoshi, you’re not a kid anymore, 
you know.” This riled him up, “They always say ‘you’re just 
a kid,’ but times like these they say ‘you’re not a kid 




anymore.’ Adults are so full of it.” The textbook then details 
the homeroom discussion that follows: Genji’s teacher talks 
about the physical and psychological changes in adolescence. 
Diary writing, rebellion, and the sense of being 
misunderstood are all raised affirmatively as examples of the 
birth of a new self. The chapter ends with suggested 
activities: a class discussion on people’s experience of these 
psychological changes, an essay on one’s experience of being 
and no longer being a kid, and a class compilation of essays 
on an emotionally stirring occasion.54 
From these two examples, we see several key points 
about education for awakening. First, Mori Akira seems to 
be suggesting a practical way to guide students to turn 
inward with stories that make them think not of the story’s 
content but of students themselves: How did I become this 
way? Am I a kid or not? What am I really? These stories are 
then reinforced by activities that encourage students to 
explore these inward intuitions and write about them (essay 
writing and diary writing). Not only do these stories focus 
inward on experience, but they focus on how the inward 
becomes apparent in collision. Mori Akira focuses on 
experiences of conflict with adults, confusion, and a sense of 
isolation. He then treats them positively, letting them know 
it’s okay to rebel and it’s okay to be confused. These show 
an educational social environment that is supportive of 
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identity and self-awareness. Finally, these differences and 
realizations are shared, showing that identity and uniqueness 
have their place in group life. 
3.3 The Development of Solidarity 
In the discussions above, we see that there is never a 
separation between “individualist” stages and “collectivist” 
stages. Individuality and solidarity are constant tasks for the 
developing person. 
Humans carry out their lives within the 
relationship with others. Furthermore, the life 
individuals carry out by themselves necessarily 
includes relationships with others. Here is the 
ontological foundation of the indivisibility of 
autonomy and solidarity. And from there, we 
also have the normative sense that autonomy 
and solidarity must be realized in relation to each 
other.55 
As a counterpart to the development of autonomy (which 
he based on Erikson, as above), he lists four stages for the 
development of solidarity. 
First, “primitive society” is the stage of groupthink and 
conformity. Mori Akira sees this as a trait common to closed 
societies, herds, and agricultural communities. This can be 
seen as solidarity based on the “overlap” of the organic layer 
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of human existence (and perhaps the rudiments of the 
conscious layer). But he sees a danger here: “ . . . the 
‘individual’ is extinguished, and the ‘totality’ dominates 
everything.” Amongst patriotisms, there is a type that tends 
to elevate this aspect to “extinguish the self, serve the 
public” (messhihôkô).56  While this stage is essential for the 
early development of persons, he does not wish that we stay 
in it any longer than we should. 
Second, “functional solidarity” is the stage where people 
participate in society in a “meaningful” way (in the Deweyan 
sense of being able to intellectually understand and grapple 
with their own action): 
Participation is not primitive “sharing” (bunyû). 
In participating, the individual, as a more or less 
autonomous individual, becomes aware of the 
“role” he/she carries out within the totality. And 
by critique and cooperation with others . . . 
realizes shared ends together.57 
This stage appears to correspond with an overlap between 
the conscious and self-awareness (S1) facets of human 
existence (socially, “role and solidarity”), which now include 
a sense of individual ability and individuality. This stage 
appears to be the first “truly democratic” stage. 
 
56 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 185. 
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Third, we have “communities of nation, class, and 
humankind” that signify stages of functional solidarity that 
are more abstract and no longer restricted to face-to-face 
groups. For Mori Akira, this stage is where we have the 
realization of “the duty of man” (ningen no honbun)—an 
aspect insufficiently stressed by Dewey.58  As examples of 
these, we have (Marxist) class solidarity, national solidarity, 
and the unity of all humankind. This is clearly based on self-
awareness (S1, individuality and solidarity) as it is shared 
between people.  
And fourth, as the highest stage of solidarity, we have 
“personal/fraternal solidarity.” Mori Akira writes: 
In order to sincerely realize humanity and 
personality, national and class solidarity must 
include personal/fraternal solidarity. Even a 
group of like-minded companions become a truly 
ethical union only when in the end, they are a 
solidarity of personality and fraternité.59 
Personal solidarity is an idea he derives from Jaspers. It 
involves a communion between people not just as 
organisms, conscious functions, or identities (S1), but a 
communion between people as unique, unrepeatable existenz 
(S2). Mori Akira does not discuss this systematically but 
gives a glimpse to some details in his discussion of three 
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virtues: trust, friendship, and tolerance (the first two being 
core Watsujian values as well). 
Rather than seeing trust as a complete faith in someone 
you fully understand (either physically or consciously), “it is 
‘a kind of wager’ and has a sense that you have ‘entrusted 
your person’ to the other.”60 It is a trust grounded in the 
uncertainty of existenz. Instead of seeing tolerance as 
founded in some clear “human dignity” that we respect, 
“One awakens to the difficulty people face trying to morally 
realize the good. Because of that self-awareness, one cannot 
criticize the faults of others without compassion. This is the 
original meaning of tolerance.”61 Finally, borrowing Jaspers’s 
words, Mori Akira speaks of friendship as “a loving 
struggle” realized not in a sense of belonging and 
camaraderie, nor in tangible organizations (with a formal 
structure) but in intangible (informal) organizations between 
people.62 
One concrete example of this existential communication 
can be found in the activity of “The Feeling of Searching for 
Myself.” Rather than a clear, conceptually grounded bond 
between citizens or the proletariat, we have the fuzzy 
relationship between adolescents who are searching for 
themselves together, trying to find people who will see them 
for the question that they are. 
 
60 Mori, Practicality and Inwardness of Education, 220. 
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Usually, one might expect that higher forms of solidarity 
get increasingly wider in scope in which the widest should 
be some form of unity with humankind. However, 
interestingly, it is personal solidarity, not the unity of 
humankind, that Mori Akira sees as the highest form of 
solidarity—pointing to his value of depth over mere breadth 
of connection. 
These four forms of solidarity were articulated in their 
mature form in the previous figure (fig. 4) where trust and 
belonging can be seen as fostered in primitive solidarity; 
togetherness and role as part of functional solidarity; sense 
of solidarity/camaraderie as part of communities of nation, 
class, and humankind; and finally, a sense of mission as part 
of personal solidarity. 
What this clarifies is that Mori Akira’s usage of Erikson 
was never psychologistic. It was, as Erikson himself 
intended, firmly entrenched in the realities (and critique of) 
society. The development of personal identity is always tied 
to social development, which relates to different kinds of 
solidarity and community. These are all parts of a 
philosophy of moral education, of human becoming, that 
clearly take up the challenge of Watsuji’s ethics of 










Above, we have seen how Mori Akira’s philosophy of 
moral education builds on and develops Watsuji’s ethics of 
emptiness. Watsuji’s philosophy of human existence focuses 
on the tensions in human life between individuality and 
community, subjectivity and objectivity, space and time. 
Mori Akira takes up these same tensions but highlights their 
development via “human becoming.” Furthermore, both 
thinkers see our ability to be true to our human existence via 
ethics/education that is founded in the virtue of 
truthfulness/sincerity, which unfolds via different virtues in 
different levels of private and public life. Because the two 
thinkers look at both the individual and relational sides of 
the human being without privileging either, neither of them 
isolate morality from justice or moral and citizenship 
education. The formation of the morality of a person 
necessarily shapes how he relates to others, to groups, to his 
nation, and to the international sphere. At the same time, 
moral and citizenship education require the forming of 
society itself—for without the society needed for trust, role-
consciousness, and self-awareness, individual morality 
cannot form either. 
However, in the process of examining the interplay of 
these two facets of human existence, we saw a fine 
distinction between the two thinkers. Watsuji saw ethics as a 
back and forth between individuality and totality. Those 
who are submerged and lost in society need to awaken to 




themselves, but this awakening must return to society in 
ethical contribution. Mori Akira seems to take a similar 
approach. For example, individuation (ex. the development 
of self-aware “self-realization”) is realized in tension with 
adults and the conventions of society (conscious solidarity 
of “togetherness” and “role”). But at the same time, drawing 
from developmental psychology, he demonstrates that even 
this individuation is always a form of communalization into 
a higher order of solidarity (from conscious solidarity to 
personal solidarity of a self-aware “sense of mission”). Thus, 
autonomy and solidarity always support each other, despite 
being in tension with any attachment to “lower forms” of 
autonomy and solidarity. One way to interpret this is that 
Watsuji’s tension was “spatial,” but Mori Akira’s was 
“temporal/generative.” 
This difference can be seen as Mori Akira’s novel 
contribution to theory. His own teacher, Tanabe Hajime, 
criticized his work (particularly Philosophical Anthropology of 
Education) as lacking dialectical savvy and failing to advance 
any new philosophical developments, despite contributing to 
the empirical proof of philosophy.63 But what we see here is 
precisely an empirically grounded but theoretically distinct 
idea of how the “dialectic” between the individual and the 
community occurs. 
 
63 Tanaka, “Reading Mori Akira,” 340–341. 




Watsuji built an impressive systematic theory of ethics 
that fully accounts for our relational existence. As we 
struggle with ethical challenges or as we help students as 
they struggle with their ethical challenges, we can ask: “Are 
we realizing human existence in both its individuality and 
communality?” But with Mori Akira, that question acquires 
a whole new depth and concreteness: “In what way am I 
called to respond to human becoming? Every struggling 
human being realizes individuality and communality—but 
what kind of individuality and communality are trying to 
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